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Abstract: This paper studies the effects of fiscal policies--depicted as stochasticchanges in
government spending and distortionary tax rates--when the government is constrained from using
lump sum taxes for achieving intertemporal budget balance. The ratio of debt to gnp, therefore,
has consequences for the future choices of government spending and distortionary taxation and
hence affects real economic activity. Further modeling fiscal policy in thisway generates results
that differ substantially from those in standard stochastic models where lump sum taxes are used
for budget balance. The modeling of fiscal policy presented here is also consistent with empirical
evidence on U.S. fiscal policy.
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This paper studies the effects of fiscal policies--
depicted as stochastic changes in government spending and
distortionary tax rates--when the government is constrained
from using lump sum taxes for achieving intertemporal budget
balance.  This framework contrasts the more standard analysis
in which spending and taxes follow exogenous Markov process
and where lump sum taxation is used to balance the
government's budget.  Although we also model tax rates and
spending as following Markov processes, the transition
probabilities of these processes depend on the ratio of
government debt to gnp.  The ratio of debt to gnp, therefore,
will have consequences for the future choices of government
spending and distortionary taxation and hence will affect real
economic activity.
Our depiction of fiscal policy gives bite to the
restriction imposed by intertemporal budget balance since debt
can not be viewed as a residual of policy that his dealt with
via lump sum means.  The results generated in our model can
differ substantially from those in standard stochastic models. 
For example, the effects due to changes in the tax rate on
capital depend on both the debt to gnp ratio and the
persistence in the tax process.  Even for processes that are
fairly persistent, increases in the tax rate on capital can
lead to increases in investment and this counterintuitive2
result is more likely to happen at very high or very low
levels of the debt to gnp ratio.
Also, the economic effects of changes in government
debt depend on the way that intertemporal budget balance is
attained.  If budget balance is primarily due to future
changes in the tax rate on capital then debt crowds out
investment.  But unlike a standard Keynesian model higher debt
ratios are associated with lower real interest rates.  If on
the other hand budget balance results from changes in the path
of tax rates on labor, then investment is actually crowded in. 
It is only when government spending varies and taxes are held
fixed that crowding out and higher interest rates are
associated with higher ratios of debt.
Our model of fiscal policy implies that the debt to
gnp ratio is mean reverting, which is consistent with evidence
in Kremers (1989), King (1990), and Bohn (1991b).  The model,
despite its simplicity, also generates debt behavior that is
reasonably consistent with U.S. data.  The final section of
the paper also indicates that our depiction of fiscal policy
may help real business cycle models resolve some labor market
anomalies.
2.  The Model3
The basic model is a standard neoclassical growth
model into which we introduce distortionary taxation and
government spending.  These variables are modeled as Markov
processes.  To maintain intertemporal government budget
balance the transition probabilities are functions of the debt
to gnp ratio.  As in Dotsey (1993) the stochastic process
characterizing fiscal policy is endogenous and the government
debt is mean reverting.  Empirically, neither Kremers (1989)
nor King (1990) can reject mean reversion in U.S. government
debt, and Bohn (1991b) finds evidence that debt levels are
mean reverting.  Bohn (1991a) also shows that deficits are
eliminated both by reductions in spending and increases in tax
rates.  Our model is consistent with these observations. 
Because all but the stochastic part of the model is standard,
we give only a brief description of the model.4
Firms
Firms maximize profits, d , which are remitted to t
households, by producing output via a constant return to scale
technology that employs both capital, k, and labor, n.  Both
factors are rented from individuals.  Capital is always
supplied inelastically while we consider both inelastic and
elastic labor supply.  Formally, 
PF:
max   d  = f(k ,n ) - r k  - w n t t t t t t t
          {k ,n } t t
where r is the rental rate on capital and w is the real wage. 
The first order conditions equate each factor's marginal
product with its rental rate.
Individuals
Individuals maximize lifetime utility which depends
on both consumption and leisure.  They are endowed with one
unit of time each period and an initial stock of capital. 
Individuals make their labor-leisure, consumption, and
investment-saving decisions taking as given wage rates and
rental rates.  They also purchase one period government debt
at a price p .  Each bond pays one unit of consumption in the t
succeeding period.  Consumers observe the current state of
fiscal policy summarized by beginning of period per capita
government debt, B , current tax rates on capital and labor tu1(ct,1 nt) Et [(1 k
t 1)rt 1 (1 )]u1(ct 1,1 nt 1)
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income,   and  , and the current level of government k n
spending.  They also know current aggregate economic
magnitudes such as output, the capital stock, employment,
investment, and end of period debt B .  Formally, the t+1
individual's problem, PI, is written
PI:
                           
 max    U = E      u(c ,1-n ) o t t
t
                           t=o
         {c ,n ,b  k } t t t+1 t+1
subject to
c  + i  + p b    (1- )w n  + (1- )r k  + b  + TR t t t t+1 t t t t t t t t
n k
k  = (1- )k  + i t+1 t t
where TR is aggregate per capita transfers, and lower case
variables indicate 
values at the individual level.
Maximization yields the following first order
conditions
(1a) u (c , 1-n ) = u (c , 1-n )(1- )w 2 t t 1 t t t t
n
(1b)
(1c) p u (c , 1-n ) =  E u (c , 1-n ) t 1 t t t 1 t+1 t+16
      We focus on the ratio of government spending to gnp rather 1
than the level of spending because the ratio is stationary making
it easy to extend our analysis to economies with steady state
growth.  One could easily add growth to our model by including
technical progress in labor productivity.  In that case one could
interpret our model as represening deviations from trend as in
King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988).
where u  refers to the partial derivative with respect to the j
j  argument. th
Fiscal Policy
The government spends resources and finances its
spending through taxes and debt.  Debt evolves according to
(2) p B  = G  + B  -  r K  -  w N  + TR t t+1 t t t t t t t t t
k n
where capital letters refer to per capita aggregate
quantities.  G is government spending, B is the stock of one-
period bonds outstanding, and TR is the level of transfers. 
Tax rates on capital and labor income,   and  , and the ratio k n
of government spending to gnp, g , depend on the debt to gnp ˜
ratio, b .   Government budget balance is achieved through ˜ 1
changes in distortionary taxation and government spending. 
Specifically, we model the elements of fiscal policy as a two-
state Markov process with transition probabilities given by
(3a) prob (  =       =  ) = min {max[(1- b ) , 0], 1} t+1 t t
˜ 1/µ
(3b)  prob (  =       =  ) = max {min[ b , 1], 0} t+1 h t h t
˜ 1/µt , ˜ gt ˜ gh, ˜ bt (1/ ) .
˜ bt 1 > 1/








      The debt to gnp ratio can temporarily move outside [0, 1/ ] 2
because next period's taxes and spending depend on this period's
debt to gnp ratio.  For example, the current state could be
  Given this state it is possible
that next period's taxes and spending will not change.  Thus
tomorrow's debt/gnp could exceed 1/  and the debt/gnp two periods
hence could be larger still.  However, since   implies
 =   and   the debt to gnp ratio will start to decline.  t+2 h
Since a combination of  , g  can only increase b  by so much, b  is h
~ ~ ~
bounded above.  Similarly, b  is bounded below.  Further our
~
process for fiscal policy rules out any Ponzi games.  That is
 for equilibrium paths in this model.
(4a)  prob (g  = g    g  = g ) = max {min[ b , 1], 0} ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ 1/
t+1 t t
(4b)  prob (g  = g    g  = g ) = min {max[(1- b ) , 0], ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ 1/
t+1 h t h t
1}
where the subscripts  , h refer to low and high values
respectively.  These transition probabilities imply that the
debt to gnp ratio is bounded and only rarely lies outside the
interval [0, 1/ ].  As b  approaches a value of 1/ , taxes will ˜
be high and spending will be low with probability one.  As
long as a combination of high taxes and low spending reduces
debt, the debt to gnp ratio will be driven down.  Similarly as
b approaches zero the economy will be in a low-tax, high- ˜
government-spending state and the debt will rise.  Thus, there
is some tendency for debt to revert toward its mean.   In what 2
follows we will call this policy a managed debt policy.8
The parameters µ and   control the persistence of
the tax and 
spending processes.  As these parameters increase the
probabilities of remaining in a given tax or spending state
increase for any value of the debt to gnp ratio.
Equilibrium
Equilibrium is a set of functions representing
quantities and prices that solve the firms and consumers
maximization problems, do not let either consumers or the
government borrow more than can be repaid, and obey the
following aggregate equilibrium conditions.
(5) C  + I  + G  = f(K , N ) t t t t t
(6) b  = B t t
(7) k  = K t t
(8) n  = N t t
We solve for equilibrium by first using equation (5)
to substitute out consumption.  Equation (1a) together with
the relationship w  = f [K , N ], and equations (7) and (8) are t 2 t t
then used to solve for labor n  = n(k , b ,  ,  , g , k ) = t t t t t t t+1
˜ n k ˜
n(s , k ) where the state s  = (k , b ,  ,  , g ).  We then t t+1 t t t t t t
˜ n k ˜
substitute for labor in equation (1b) to yield
(9) u [f(k , n(s , k )) + (1- )k  - g  - k , 1-n(s , k )] 1 t t t+1 t t t+1 t t+1Et[(1 k
t 1)f1(kt 1,n(st 1,kt 2)) (1 )]
9
   =   
     x u [f(k , n(s , k )) + (1- )k  - g  - k , 1- 1 t+1 t+1 t+2 t+1 t+1 t+2
n(s , k )] t+1 t+2
Equation (9) is a nonlinear second order stochastic difference
equation.  Given n(s, k') where the "'" indicates next
period's value of a variable, we solve for the function, k' =
h(s) which is the fixed point of (9).  This equilibrium policy
function for k' then yields the equilibrium policy function
for labor n, because n was a function of arbitrary k'.  At
each step of the iteration we use equations (1c) and (2) to
determine b ' based on the current state s and the policy
˜
functions n and h.  The algorithm is similar to the discrete
state space method described in Baxter (1991) and Dotsey and
Mao (1992).
3. Stochastic Taxes
We can highlight the effects of distortionary
taxation by comparing an equilibrium generated by a policy
with managed debt with the standard case in which taxes follow
an exogenous Markov process.  Our comparisons are based on an
examination of policy functions, impulse response functions,
and impact effects.  To understand the effects of fiscal
policy, we proceed sequentially by first taking the simplest10
      This number is taken from King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988). 3
case--a stochastic tax rate on capital and a fixed tax on
labor with inelastic labor supply--and then proceed to the
more general cases.  
The experiments in this section are dynamic
stochastic analogs to comparative static analysis.  Our
fundamental concern is understanding the workings of a fairly
intricate fiscal policy process.  We use post-Korean War U.S.
data as a rough guide for calibrating the models.  We fix the
ratio of government spending to gnp at .18, which is the ratio
reported in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991).  We also fix the
level of transfers at 8% of gnp.  In our experiments the debt
to gnp ratio essentially lies between 0 and 1/2.  Until
recently, measured government debt/gnp has remained within
this range.  Picking a limited range also helps conserve on
grid points.
Our remaining parameter values are within the realm
of most real business cycle models.  Labor's share of gnp is
chosen to be .6, utility is logarithmic and separable in
consumption and leisure, the discount factor is .97, and the
depreciation rate on capital is .10.  We parameterize the
utility function so that individuals spend 20% of their time
working. 311
      For example, the probabilities of taxes remaining in the 4
low-tax state for debt/gnp ratios of (-.10, -.063, -.026, .011,
.047, .084, .121, .158, .195, .232, .268, .305, .342, .379, .416,
.453, .489, .526, .563, .60) are (1.0, 1.0, 1.0, .99, .98, .95,
.93, .91, .88, .85, .82, .78, .75, .70, .64, .55, .38, 0, 0, 0). 
It is not until the debt/gnp ratio reaches .49 that next
period's tax rate is more likely to be high than low.
(a) Fixed Labor Supply with the variable tax rates on income
from capital
In this example we allow the tax rate on capital to
vary and use a persistance parameter of µ=4.  With this
parameter, tax rates are unlikely to change for most of the
values for the debt/gnp ratio.   The tax rate on capital takes 4
on the value of either .20 or .50.  The mean of the tax rate
is .37 with a standard deviation .149 and an AR1 coefficient
of .64.  This parameterization is roughly consistent with one
of the series reported in Auerbach and Hines (1988) which has
a mean of .40, a standard deviation of .141, and an AR1
coefficient of .82.  We choose a somewhat lower than actual
persistence to illustrate an interesting result, that it can
be optimal for agents to invest more when taxes are high even
when taxes on capital are persistent.
The policy functions for capital and consumption,
and the equilibrium function for the real after-tax rate of
interest are displayed in Figure 1.  The policy functions are 
drawn for a capital value chosen from the middle of capital's
ergodic set.  As shown, the capital stock in the high tax12
      For example see Coleman (1991) or Dotsey (1990).  In a 5
nonstochastic environment see Judd (1987), Abel (1982), Abel and
Blanchard (1983), Becker (1985), Brock and Turnousky (1981),
Danthine and Donaldson (1985), and Hall (1981).
state (dotted line) lies above the capital stock in the low
tax state.  This result implies that investment is higher when
taxes are high even though a high tax rate today generally
implies a high tax rate next period.  This result is the same
as the one in Dotsey (1993) for an economy using a linear
technology and occurs for the same reason.  A high tax rate
today lowers the debt to gnp ratio implying that the future
path of taxes will be lower and that investment is profitable. 
This response is only optimal if tax rates are not too
persistent.  If we set µ=6 implying an AR1 coefficient on
taxes of .69, agents will invest less when taxes are high. 
Therefore, for a tax process displaying persistence that
conforms more closely to the data investment will fall when
the tax rate rises.  Further, investment declines with debt
because higher debt levels implies higher future taxes.
The above result stands in sharp contrast to the
standard tax literature , where labor supply is typically 5
fixed and taxes follow a Markov process.  As long as tax rates
are positively correlated the standard case implies that high
taxes today result in higher future tax rates reducing
investment.  13
The policy function for consumption is a mirror
image of the policy function for capital.  With inelastic
labor supply investing more implies consuming less.  The
equilibrium function for interest rates is also shown in
Figure 1 and its shape is related to the policy function for
consumption.  Interest rates are lower in the high tax state
due to the upward slope of the consumption policy function. 
When taxes are high today, debt and consumption will fall next
period, while if taxes are low, debt and consumption will
rise.  This implies that for any given debt level interest
rates in the high tax state lie below those in the low tax
state.  The interest rate equilibrium functions are also
downward sloping attaining their lowest value when debt is
high.  In the high tax-high debt state there is little
probability that a low tax rate will occur tomorrow, hence the
expected consumption decline is relatively large implying a
low real interest rate.  In the low tax state there is a
reasonably high probability that high taxes will occur
tomorrow, implying a relatively small expected increase in
consumption and hence a lower real interest rate.  Similarly
rates are higher when the debt is low.
The extent to which debt is non-neutral in our model
can be illustrated by the elasticity of the various policy
functions with respect to debt around the steady state debt to
gnp ratio (see Table 1) and by the correlations between debt14
and other endogous variables (see Table 2).  An increase in
debt crowds out investment and slightly increases consumption. 
The non-neutrality in this model differs from a standard
Keynesian model because real rates in this model are
negatively related to the level of debt.  These features also
appear in the correlation coefficients which show a negative
correlation between debt and investment as well as a negative
correlation between debt and the real interest rate.
(b) Variable labor supply with variable tax rates on income
from capital
For these experiments we keep the same parameter
values but allow labor to vary.  The policy functions for
capital, labor, consumption, and the equilibrium function for
the real after-tax interest rate are depicted in Figure 2. 
The policy functions for capital and consumption differ from
those in the fixed labor case.  With varying labor, agents now
invest more, work more, and consume less in the low tax state
over much of the debt space.
Variable labor creates another degree of freedom in
the model.  With labor fixed, changes in investment must be
offset one for one with changes in consumption.  With variable
labor that need not be the case since output can adjust
contemporaneously.  Variable labor allows consumption to be15
much smoother and at the same time allows investors to take
advantage of low persistent marginal tax rates.
Persistence of the tax processes also plays a role
in the shape of the policy functions.  Reducing the
persistence of the tax series by setting µ=2.5, which implies
=.53 yields the same qualitative results as the fixed labor
case.  Crossovers in the policy functions occur because the
expected duration of remaining in any particular state depends
on the value of the debt to gnp ratio.  For example, if debt
were high and taxes were low, agents would expect taxes to
rise and stay high for a greater number of periods than if
taxes were currently high.  Hence they invest less in the low
tax state.  One surprise is that variable labor has little
affect on the equilibrium function for real interest rates. 
The interest rate depends on intertemporal rates of
substitution and, therefore, depends on next period's
consumption.  The consumption policy function is drawn for a
specific value of capital, and capital is changing over time. 
Because next period's capital is higher in the low-tax state
next period's consumption will be higher despite rising debt. 
The shift in the curves due to capital accumulation dominates
movement along the curve and there is greater consumption
growth when taxes are low.
Evaluating the elasticities of the various policy
functions with respect to debt and the correlation16
coefficients leads to the conclusion that only half of the
standard Keynesian story occurs.  Higher debt crowds out
investment but reduces the interest rate.
(c) Variable labor with a varying labor tax and fixed tax on
capital income
We next examine the effects of varying the tax on
labor income rather than the tax on capital.  Here we allow
labor tax rates to vary between .16 and .24.  With µ=8, these
rates have a mean of .217, a standard deviation of .036, and
an AR1 coefficient of .76.  Using post-Korean War data our tax
process matches the one constructed by Barro and Sahasakul
(1986), which has a mean of .278, a standard deviation of
.039, and an AR1 coefficient for their detrended series of
.78.
Intratemporal substitution effects in the labor-
leisure decision dominate the results.  Individuals substitute
labor effort into low tax states, driving up the marginal
productivity of capital and hence increasing investment
demand.  Greater labor effort results in more output and more
is invested.  As debt rises, the probability of high taxes
next period increases thus inducing individuals to take even
greater advantage of the current low tax rate.  In the low tax
state, high debt means that future taxes are more likely to be
high so the incentive to work is greater than when debt is17
low.  Thus the policy function for labor effort is upward
sloping (see Figure 3).
Because the policy function for both labor and
capital are now upward sloping (a non-Keynesian result) the
policy function for consumption is downward sloping even
though there is more output available at high levels of debt. 
Agents, however, consume and invest more in the low tax state
due to increased labor effort and greater output.  As in the
previous case interest rates are higher when taxes are low. 
This is because capital and, therefore, next period's
consumption increase when taxes are low.  
The variable tax on labor income creates crowding in
rather than crowding out, just the opposite of the standard
Keynesian story.  The policy function for investment has a
positive elasticity and positive correlation with respect to
debt while the real interest rate is negatively correlated
with debt.
The managed debt case also yields somewhat greater
impact effects than the standard exogenous Markov case because
of the stronger intertemporal substitution effects on labor
effort (see Table 3).  With debt management, lower current
taxes imply a higher future path of taxes making agents work
even harder today.  The greater impact in effort feeds over
into output and investment.  18
(d) Taxing both labor and capital
In this example both labor and capital are taxed at
the same rate, which is equivalent to a production tax.  The
results are a hybrid of the results in the last two sections. 
The large divergence in policy functions (Figure 4) between
high and low tax states reflects the responsiveness of labor
to a tax on wage income.  The negative slope of the capital
and labor policy functions as well as the positive slope of
the consumption policy function reflect the influence of the
tax on capital.  Because this case is hybrid of the previous
two experiments, the elasticity of investment with respect to
debt is greatly diminished from the case when only   varies.  k
Thus with a production tax there is much less crowding out
than in the case where only income from capital is taxed.  The
interest rate, however, varies indirectly with government debt
and thus only half of the traditional Keynesian story holds.
4. Government Spending
This section examines the effects of government
spending.  To highlight the differences from standard models,
we first keep tax rates constant throughout and allow lump sum
taxes to balance the budget when spending follows an exogenous
two state Markov process.  When there are no lump sum taxes
government spending must adjust so that the debt to gnp ratio19
is bounded.  We allow government spending relative to gnp to
vary between .14 and .22.  Its mean is .17 in the following
experiments and its standard deviation is .039.  The parameter
 is varied between 6 and 1 implying AR1 coefficients of .73
and .10.  This allows us to explore the effects that
persistence has on economic activity.  The government taxes
production at the constant rate of 26%.  After isolating the
effects of government spending, we allow tax rates and
spending to vary simultaneously.
(a) Persistent Government Spending
We assume that government spending is useless.  The
economic response to changes in government spending,
therefore, mainly arise through wealth and crowding out
effects.  The policy functions in Figure 5, show that  agents
work harder and consume less when spending is high.  Although
high government spending causes high output through increased
labor effort, output rises by less than government spending. 
Hence next period's capital stock falls.
As debt rises the expected future path of government
spending falls.  The policy function for labor is, therefore,
downward sloping with respect to debt while the consumption
policy function is upward sloping.  As labor hours decrease,
output and the capital stock fall.  Hence debt crowds out
investment.  High government spending raises interest rates20
motivating agents to work harder and consume less.  As the
debt rises, implying less future government spending, labor
effort, capital, and consumption growth decline.  Thus the
equilibrium function for interest rates is downward sloping
with respect to debt.  
Even though the equilibrium function for the
interest rate is negatively related to debt, the correlation
between interest rates and debt is positive.  The intuition
can be seen by examining the economy's response to a high
government spending shock, which is displayed in Figure 6. 
Debt rises when spending is above its average value causing
spending to eventually fall below its steady state expected
value.  This mild oscillatory behavior in spending sets up
oscillatory behavior in the other variables.  As spending
falls and debt rises, labor effort declines.  However,
declining government spending allows agents to increase
consumption and investment even though output mimics the
behavior of labor.  The real rate is generally above its
steady state value as a result of consumption growth, so the
correlations between debt and investment and debt and interest
rates resemble the predictions of standard Keynesian models. 
Investment is below average when the debt is relatively high
while interest rates are above average.
With the exception of labor (and as a result
output), the behavior of the other endogenous variables is not21
      We calculated the present value of government spending to 6
be about 10% less for the mean reverting debt policy in this
example.
strikingly different from what occurs when spending follows an
exogenous Markov process.  The impact effects in Table 4 show
that labor responds with more vigor to an increase in
government spending when spending follows a Markov process. 
In the debt management case  higher spending raises the level
of debt implying that future spending must be lower than it
otherwise would have been.  The wealth effects are, therefore,
smaller than when spending is exogenous. 6
(b)  The effects of lowering persistence
When the persistence in government spending is
greatly reduced by setting  =1 implying an AR1 coefficient on
spending of .10, the results for the exogenous Markov process
and the managed debt process are very similar (see Figure 7). 
Government spending is more transitory and causes smaller
wealth effects.  Thus the impact effects of a rise in spending
are much smaller (see Table 4 and Figure 7).  These results
are consistent with those in Aiyagari, Christiano, and
Eichenbaum (1991) and Baxter and King (1993).  Also, because
government spending changes states so frequently the debt
doesn't fluctuate very much and the path of shocks generated22
by each process are almost identical.  As a result all
endogenous variables behave in a like manner.  
(c)  The effects of very high persistence
In this experiment we examine McGrattan's (1992)
suggestion that very high persistence in government spending
can lead to increased investment in the high spending state. 
To generate high persistence we set  =100 which corresponds to
an AR1 coefficient of .92.  We find that with log utility and
hence a relative risk aversion parameter of  =1 it is possible
for investment to be higher when spending is high, but only
over a narrow range of the debt space.  With an exogenous
Markov process for spending, investment is higher when
spending is high, but this result is sensitive to the degree
of relative risk aversion.  With increased risk aversion ( =2)
investment is lower when spending is high in both the managed
debt and exogenous Markov process cases.
The reason for the disparity in results is that with
debt mangement the wealth effects of high or low government
spending are almost identical near the boundaries of the debt
space.  If, for example, debt levels are very high the
probability that next period's government spending will be low
and stay low is high no matter what the current state. 
Therefore, labor effort and consumption do not differ by very
much across spending states and the major difference across23
the two states is in investment.  In particular, investment is
lower in the high spending state.  An analogous argument
indicates that investment is lower in the high spending state
when debt is very low.  It is only in the middle of the debt
space that the wealth effects of high spending can cause
enough of an increase in labor effort and decline in
consumption that investment is higher.  The large increase in
labor effort also increases the marginal product of capital
reinforcing the wealth effects on consumption and investment. 
When government spending follows an exogenous Markov process
the persistence of the process is independent of debt levels. 
Therefore, wealth effects and the accompanying substitution
effects are either strong enough to encourage investment when
spending is high or they are not.
An increased persistence in government spending and
the accompanying higher investment in the high spending state
results in greater consumption variability as well.  With CRRA
utility, an increase in relative risk aversion implies a
reduction in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of
consumption.  With agents less willing to substitute
intertemporally, investment becomes less variable, and
therefore it is less likely that investment will rise in
response to high government spending.
(d)  Taxes and Spending Both Vary24
In this case we now add persistent taxes and compare
how simultaneously varying taxes and spending affects
behavior.  These comparisons are done by examining the impulse
response functions in figures 8 and 9 which are responses to a
high spending-low tax shock and a high spending-high tax
shock.
The combination of low taxes and high spending is
more expansionary than just lowering taxes or increasing
spending.  The tax induced substitution effects augment the
wealth effects of government spending implying that labor
effort increases by a large amount.  This increases output by
enough so that the impact effect on both consumption and
investment is positive.
When the initial impulse to taxes is high, (Figure
9) the impact effect of fiscal policy is reversed.  With an
increase in the tax rate substitution effects outweigh wealth
effects and labor effort falls.  The fall in labor effort
results in lower output, consumption, investment, and a drop
in the real rate of interest.  Thus the expansionary effect on
output of government spending programs can be totally
overturned if they are financed out of current tax revenue. 
This latter result is consistent with the analysis in Baxter
and King (1993).25
      We use his data because it doesn't net out any components 7
of government spending.  If we are to have any chance of matching
the series on debt we must either use inclusive measures or model
the different components of spending separately.  We start in
1916 because that is the inception of income taxes, and the data
over the entire sample, 1800-1988, does not appear to be
generated by the simple model in this paper (i.e. the mean of
government spending and tax revenue vary greatly over the last
two centuries).  To match the data we would need more than one
fiscal policy regime.  As it is the model is forced to confront
two major wars in order to get enough data points for the spectra
to have any meaning.  What we would like is 100 years of post-
Korean war data.
5. Implications for Debt Behavior and Business Cycles
(a)  Debt
In this section we parameterize our tax and
government spending processes to roughly match the actual
post-1916 stochastic processes exhibited in Bohn's (1991a)
data on U.S. fiscal policy.   To do this requires some 7
essential modifications both to the permissible debt space and
the stochastic structure.  The mean reverting debt model with
two states generates too much oscillatory behavior.  We thus
construct a hybrid process that allows taxes and spending to
follow exogenous Markov processes on some portion of the
interior of the debt space but force both processes to be
responsive to debt/gnp ratios near the boundaries. 
Specifically, we use three states for tax rates and two for
government spending.  The admissible range for the debt to gnp
ratio is [-.1, 1.1].  The model generates tax data that has a
mean of .14, a standard deviation of .04, and an AR126
      The spectra were estimated using linearly detrended data.  8
Since the model data do not display any trend the model data is
in deviation from mean form.
coefficient of .87, while government spending has a mean of
.15, a standard deviation of .07, and an AR1 coefficient of
.80.  Our parameterization thus produces tax rates and
spending ratios close to post-1916 data.  The comparable
statistics for the data are .14, .04, and .89 for taxes and
.158, .08, and .80 for government spending.  The spectra for
actual debt to gnp ratios and the average of 200 simulations
of the model are shown in Figure 10 along with the coherence
between actual debt and the model's debt (one standard
deviation error bands are represented by the dotted lines.)   8
The coherence is roughly 50 percent with a downward spike at
approximately the frequency exhibited by wars.  Given the
simplicity of the model, its ability to match actual debt
behavior this well is encouraging.  For instance, the level of
coherence is higher than that displayed by real business cycle
models for many relevant economic magnitudes (see Watson
(1990)).27
      For both the case of managed debt and the exogenous Markov 9
process, g varies between .22 and .30.  The standard deviations
for g are .0387 and .04, respectively.
(b)  business cycles
Recent work by Braun (1988), Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1991) and McGrattan (1988, 1991) indicate that
including fiscal policy in standard real business cycle models
can produce noticeable improvements in the fit of these
models, especially with respect to labor market behavior. 
Most RBC models understate the relative volatility between
hours and output and overstate the relative volatility between
productivity and hours.  The models also overstate the
correlation between labor productivity and output and labor
productivity and hours (see Hanson (1985), King, Plosser and
Rebelo (1988), and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991)).
An increase in government spending produces negative
wealth effects which induce more labor effort and more output. 
Because of labor's declining marginal product, government
spending shocks reduce average productivity and set up a
negative correlation between average product and either output
or hours.  This negative correlation, however, only occurs
when government spending follows an exogenous Markov process
(see column 7, Table 5).   In this case all increases in 9
spending are financed by lump sum taxes and future spending
does not have to respond to budget imbalance.  This modeling28
of fiscal policy is at odds with the empirical findings of
Bohn (1991a) who finds that 65-70 percent of a deficit caused
by higher spending is reduced by decreases in future spending. 
Thus a process that captures this type of behavior represents
a more realistic model.  
In the more realistic managed debt case, when only
government spending varies, the relevant correlations are only
somewhat lower than those produced by standard RBC models (see
column 6, Table 4).  The positive correlation between average
productivity and either output or hours occurs despite the
fact that labor hours and output rise on impact while wages
fall.  The impulse response functions in Figure 5 show that
labor hours (or output) and wages are below their steady state
values in periods 5-15 and above their steady state values in
periods 15-25.  Labor hours and the wage rate both reach their
minimums when debt levels reach their maximum.  As debt
increases the expected future path of spending falls below its
steady state value.  At the same time the capital stock has
fallen and wages remain below their steady state value.  This
behavior accounts for the positive correlation displayed by
these two series.
When spending and taxes both vary, the debt
management policy  produces the desired negative correlations
in the labor market and a lower relative variability in
average productivity than a technology shock (see column 8,29
      In this experiment with µ= =10, taxes and spending are 10
highly persistent.  Tax rates take on values of either .228 or
.292 and g takes on values of either .24 or .28.  We do this in
order to lower the variability of both processes to better
conform with the data.  The standard deviation of tax rates is
.03 which corresponds to the Barro and Sahasakul (1986) series
while that of the ratio of government spending to gnp is .019. 
The latter figure is consistent with the standard deviation of
spending net of military, transfers, and debt financing relative
to gnp over 1947-1988.  However,  /  = 2.33 (1.60 for the G y
Markov case).  This latter figure is still somewhat higher than
the 1.15 figure reported by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991). 
Additional sources of output variability would allow us to better
match this data.
Table 5).   In this case there is also little to distinguish 10
the managed debt process from the exogenous Markov process,
indicating that when taxes and government spending jointly
depend on debt, our methodology should be able to replicate
much of the improvement in RBC models reported by Braun (1988)
and McGrattan (1988, 1991).
6. Conclusion
This paper has examined an alternative methodology
for studying the effects of fiscal policy.  Our model of
fiscal policy takes the consequences of intertemporal budget
balance seriously and at the same time allows for uncertainty
in the fiscal policy process.  The combination of these two
elements is able to generate behavior that is, in some
instances, strikingly different from standard results.  Namely
debt is non-neutral, the expansionary effects of government
spending are dampened, and the taxation of capital can have30
surprising and counterintuitive results.  The model generates
cases where debt crowds in investment and the behavior of the
real interest rate differs from behavior portrayed in standard
Keynesian models.  The model is also consistent with empirical
evidence on U.S. fiscal policy as well as with the behavior of
U.S. government debt.  Finally this modeling strategy shows
promise in helping to correct some of the labor market
anomalies found in standard real business cycle models.31
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TABLE 1
Elasticity of Policy Functions Around Steady State
Debt/GNP Ratios
*
          Case 1               Case 2               Case 3               Case 4          
 Case 5
     (low)   (high)   (low)   (high)   (low)   (high)   (low)   (high)  k k k k n n
g(low)  g(high)
c    .079      .079     .058      .061     -.009    -.007     .015     .015   
.024    .028
n    .000      .000    -.090     -.095      .014     .012    -.021    -.026   -
.038   -.042
i   -.267     -.264    -.427     -.474      .058     .056    -.071    -.127   -
.141   -.185
y    .000      .000     .004      .004     -.001    -.005     .001     .001   
.001    .001
r   -.122     -1.14    -.399     -1.47     -.020    -.018    -.146    -.478   -
.079   -.083
Case 1 is for fixed labor and variable tax rates on rental income from capital;
*
Case 2 is for variable tax rates on capital with variable labor; case 3 is for
variable taxes on labor income; case 4 is for variable taxes on total income,
and case 5 is for variable government spending.35
TABLE 2
Correlation Coefficients with Respect to the Debt to
GNP Ratio
(3000 observations)
          Case   I         r         C         N      
 Y
 varies N fixed (µ=4) -.95     -.26      .75       na     K
-.24
 varies N varies (µ=4) -.93     -.40      .40     -.92     K
-.69
 varies (µ=8)  .08     -.72      .45     -.03      N
.25
  varies (µ=10) -.15     -.54      .85     -.02     
.22
g  varies ( =6) -.57      .93     -.72     -.51    
-.80
g  varies ( =1) -.40      .99     -.96     -.37    
-.74
g  varies ( =6),   varies (µ=4) -.21     -.52      .68     
.09      .19
g  varies ( =10),   varies (µ=10)  -.47     -.42      .51     -
.20     -.0836
TABLE 3
Impact Effects for a Decline in Taxes
(measured as minus the ratio of the percent deviation
from steady state values to the percent deviation 
in the decline in taxes)
                                                    Managed debt
          Case  Y  N   C    I  r   W
 varies N fixed (µ=4)  0  0  .004 -.008 K
1.73   0
 varies N varies (µ=4) .010 .011 -.006  .061 K
1.53 -.003
 varies (µ=8) .194 .327  .062  .604 N
 .508  .145
  varies (µ=10) .296 .494  .056  .934
2.09  .175
  Markov
 varies N fixed (  =.64)  0  0 -.077  .24 1.41 K   0                       K
 varies N varies (  =.64) .057 .094 -.060  .421 K 1.48 -.036                        K
 varies (  =.76) .171 .286  .063  .510 N  .385  .134               N
 varies ( =.70) .304 .504  .030 1.016
1.549  .15537
TABLE 4
Impact Effects for a Rise in Government Spending
          Managed debt
       Case   Y   N   C   I   r   W
 fixed  =6  .049  .082 -.052
-.434  .221 -.032
 fixed  =1  .020  .033 -.021
-.625  .126 -.013
 varies  =6, µ=4  .407  .680  .062
 .490 2.20  .223
 varies  =10, µ=10  .388  .653 -.017
 .651 2.58  .144
   Markov
 fixed  =.73  .083  .138 -.090 g
-.265  .325 -.055
 fixed  =.10  .038  .062 -.040 g
-.559  .187 -.025
 varies  =.56,  =.60  .507  .844 -.029 g
1.027 2.10  .183
 varies  =.77,  =.81  .445  .744 -.088 g
1.01 2.40  .09738
TABLE 5
1
Correlation Coefficients and Relative Variances
                    U.S. Data           RBC Model           G varies( =6, =.73)      G g
varies( =10, =.81) g
                                                          fixed                    
varies ( =10, =.77)
                                                     Managed                  Managed      
                              H      CE   H    CE    KPR
 Debt      Markov Debt      Markov        
                 (1)    (2)      (3)   (4)   (5)        (6)       (7)            (8)      
(9)
                                                                                           
             
/  .73    .44  .31   .57   .64  .39       1.70  .67       .72 c y
/ 4.89 3.14        2.31 3.76       3.26 2.38      2.61 i y
/  .94    .86  .52   .36   .48  .80       2.01 1.31      1.29 n y
/  .67    .71  .50   .67   .69  .40       1.21  .52       .59 y/n y
2
/  .71    .61  .97  1.85  1.43  .50        .60  .40       .46 y/n n
3
corr (c,y)  .85  .89         .87  .19       -.75  .50       .58 
corr (i,y)  .92  .99         .92 -.03       -.99  .77       .85
corr (n,y)  .76  .98         .79  .92        .90  .93       .90
corr (y/n,y)  .42  .98         .90  .64       -.67 -.42      -.27 4
corr (y/n,n)         .16        .95 +.29       -.93 -.72      -.66
                                                                                           
               
The data reported in this table are from Hansen (1985) and the establishment data in 1
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991).  The moments for RBC models are from Hansen (1985) and39
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991) for the cases where labor is divisible and government
spending has no value.  The model moments from King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and for
the Long and Plosser model with realistic depreciation and persistence in the technology
shock.
This ratio is the one reported for wages and output. 2
This ratio is the one reported for wages and hours. 3
This correlation is the one reported for wages and output. 4